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Introduction
In granting spectrum rights to provide wireless communication services, national regulatory authorities (NRAs) often employ policy instruments to encourage mobile network operator (MNO) entry, and in doing so attempt to influence aftermarket competition.
1 For instance, some regulators set-aside licenses for potential entrant bidders, 2 or issue targeted bidding credits (by discounting winning bid prices or providing additional amounts of spectrum).
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Other policy instruments that are intended to encourage entry include the license assignment mode (auction or 'beauty contest') 4 and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than incumbent firms (excess licenses) 5 (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003) .
The apparent justification for the policies is the presence of high wireless service market entry barriers. In particular, incumbents generally value licenses more than potential entrants because winning licenses prevents entry and restricts aftermarket competition. Also, legacy 1 The environment in which Western European NRAs assigned spectrum to MNOs during 1999-2001 was shaped by the European Commission (1997) Directive 97/13/EC that stated new operators should be encouraged to enter markets to ensure the development of European telecommunications service markets. In particular, the UMTS Forum argued that market entry was required to stimulate competition and that optimum subscriber benefit will only be achieved when competing infrastructures provide advanced and innovative services (UMTS Forum, 1998) . 2 Potential entrants are firms that do not operate second-generation (2G) networks in the nation assigning spectrum. However, if NRAs want to influence aftermarket competition by setting-aside licenses they need perfect information about potential licensee valuations. This is important as the inefficiency of allocating a license to a low-value (inefficient) firm may outweigh any positive effect on social welfare due to market entry (Hoppe et al., 2006) . 3 However, to assure entry, bidding credits must raise entrants' willingness to pay above an incumbents preemptive willingness to pay (Hoppe et al., 2006; Gruber, 2007; Azacis and Burguet, 2008; Ansari and Munir, 2008) . Recently, Cramton et al. (2011) theoretically demonstrated that the impact of bidding credits on enhancing competition is ambiguous. 4 Beauty contests require that MNOs submit plans or bids including spectrum-use plans. NRAs then hear proposals and award spectrum to operators. Importantly, spectrum price is only one aspect of NRA decisions. Conversely, auctions require operators to make price bids for spectrum lots. Thus, auctions are competitive, price-based mechanisms that should result in allocations to operators with the highest spectrum valuations (Cramton, 2002: 608) . 5 For the sampled assignments, operators can only win one license. Hence, the presence of excess licenses provides potential entrants with an enhanced opportunity of winning spectrums.
infrastructure is readily leveraged to provide third-generation (3G) services. 6 Moreover, there are substantial establishment costs on entering new markets.
7 Surprisingly, there is an absence of empirical research indicating whether NRA policy instruments influence the probability of entry into 3G national markets. The resolution of this question is fundamentally important given industry convergence, the growth in the demand for data services and the spectrum dividend made available from the 'switch off' of analogue networks. Moreover, Gruber (2007) and Hazlett and Muñoz (2009) argued that the benefits from entry, including lower retail prices and improved service quality, are expected to be substantial. Most likely, this paucity of empirical analysis results from data limitations.
Namely, the available data sets typically do not include information on whether potential entrants decide to bid or not.
Accordingly, the econometric analysis requires that potential entrant participation decisions be incorporated into the estimating equations, i.e., sample selection issues be addressed. This study obtains consistent parameter estimates by treating the issue as an omitted variable problem. The proxy variable is sourced from a censored entrant-to-bidder ratio regression.
Additionally, ancillary instrumental variable (IV) binomial probit and Poisson regressions address endogeneity bias concerns relating to the specification of the entry probability equation. Namely, endogeneity concerns arise when regulators design assignments to encourage entry, and these instruments are arguments in the entry probability equation.
Following the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method, residuals calculated from those 6 Hoppe et al. (2006) studied the relationship between the number of 3G spectrum licenses offered and aftermarket competition (or market structure proxied by the number of active firms). They found incumbents were more willing to deter entry the greater is the potential fall in profit. 7 Positioning costs include infrastructure deployment; establishing administrative functions; and marketing and promotion. The extent that these expenditures are barriers to entry varies by entrant.
ancillary regressions are introduced as additional arguments in the second-stage binomial probit probability of entry equation.
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Using a unique dataset covering national 3G spectrum license awards, the principal research question addressed is: do regulators' licensing policy instruments promote entry? The econometric results show that the entry probability is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.
Market Entry, Assignment Mode and License Conditions
National 3G spectrum assignment data is sourced from the DotEcon Spectrum Awards Database (2008) . This resource is a global record of radio spectrum awards for mobile telephony, fixed and broadband wireless access, fixed links and digital radio licenses.
DotEcon records the winning bidder, characteristics of the license and assignments (including country, frequency band, date, assignment mode, spectrum size, duration, price and whether licenses are set-aside for entrants), and relevant demographic and economic indicators.
To analyse entry, only 'contested' (by incumbents and potential entrants) license assignments are modelled. 9 This approach provides a sample of 141 national license awards from 49 assignments for the period 1999-2008. These data are augmented with information obtained from MNO, NRA and media Web sites. In particular, whether the winning bid made is by carriers that operate national 2G networks prior to 3G spectrum assignment.
License assignments are mostly made by auction or administrative tender (beauty contest). In auctions operator's 'simply' price-bid for spectrum. Conversely, beauty contests require operators bid for spectrum via multiple-dimension plans that include intended use of the spectrum, network coverage and aftermarket service pricing. Table 1 shows that 29 national 8 Importantly, the approach is applicable to a wide range of selection problems where data availability is limited. 9 Infrequently, regulators attempted to encourage entry by setting aside licenses for potential entrants. That is, incumbents cannot bid. Accordingly, the licenses are not included in the sample for estimation.
assignments are by beauty contest, while 20 are by auction. These data also indicate that, the entrant-license ratio is statistically equivalent for both auction and beauty contest assignment modes. Importantly, the environment within which licenses are offered is affected by NRA positions on entry. However, NRA positions on market entry are usually unobservable. Further, the use of assignment mode only imperfectly suggests any regulatory bias towards market entry. That is, it is possible that NRAs could more easily encourage entry via beauty contests, rather than trusting to the vagaries of auctions (where incumbents have incentives to outbid potential entrants in auctions). Alternatively, incumbents are probably more likely to be successful in politically-oriented lobbying processes than are potential entrants: Since incumbents have more to lose than entrants have to gain, incumbents are willing to spend more.
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In addition to assignment mode, NRAs might attempt to encourage entry by: making available more licenses than incumbent operators (excess licenses), setting aside licenses for potential entrants, and offering potential entrant-only concessions. Such concessions include targeted bidding credits, viz., licenses that contain more spectrum when awarded to an entrant and price discounts. Both instruments lower an entrant's average spectrum price per megahertz. Note: (a) World Bank income classification; (b) base percentage awarded licenses (number) by income; (c) Belgium had a set-aside license, however, ultimately it was awarded to the state-owned incumbent, Belgacom. Klemperer (2002) argued this was due to potential entrant perception about incumbent dominance.
11 Also, Greece was the only country not to have made available excess licenses. 12 The anticipated sign of the coefficient is negative.
Next, the relationship between new entry and excess licenses is explored via the joint probabilities reported in Table 6 reports the conditional probability of entry with excess licenses available at 0.25. Further, the probability that there is entry when there are no excess licenses is 0.18.
Thus, market entry occurs when incumbent numbers equal or exceed available licenses, also the presence of excess licenses does not ensure entry. For assignment mode, Table 7 shows the entry probability is marginally higher for auctions. 
Econometric Method
The baseline entry probability model is:
Pr (Entry 1) ( Instruments Attributes Market Conditions error) F ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
where Pr (Entry 1) = is the probability that potential entrants win licenses. Instruments is a vector of regulator-determined spectrum policy instruments, Attributes is a vector of spectrum package attributes, and Market Conditions contains a vector of national economic and mobile market condition variables.
To incorporate potential entrant participation decisions into the estimating equations, i.e., address sample selection issues, requires that potential selection bias is treated as an omitted variable problem. Furthermore, endogeneity concerns arise when regulators design assignments to encourage entry. These endogeneity bias concerns are addressed by including residuals from several instrumental variable (IV) regressions as additional arguments in (1).
The methods used to address these concerns are detailed below.
Following Greene (2008: 884) , the simplest selection (incidental truncation) equation is:
with the equation of primary interest given by:
where i y is observed only if 0 i z * > . The standard result is that with i u and i ε distributed bivariate normal with zero means and correlation ρ ,
where ii
wδ Clearly, least squares regression produces inconsistent estimates of β when the independent variable λ is omitted.
That is, consistent parameter estimates of the sample selection model require estimation by maximum likelihood or Heckman (1979) two-step estimation procedure (see Greene: 888).
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However, neither approach is feasible as the current sample does not contain data on the selection mechanism variable, i.e., whether potential entrants decide to bid or not. Potential entrants initially must assess their willingness to apply for spectrum and then, whether to submit bids. If potential entrants perceive a disadvantage relative to incumbents, they might not bid, or they may form consortia with incumbents. Both types of behaviour were observed in spectrum assignments (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003: 286) .
The approach adopted is to replace the independent variable λ with a proxy sourced from a censored (Tobit) regression explaining the entrant-to-bidder ratio (BIDRATIO). The Tobit model explicitly recognises the sequential decision process of bidders. That is, an increased BIDRATIO residual enhances the probability of entry. 14 Including ˆi e (the BIDRATIO residual) on the right-hand side of (3) controls for any endogeneity arising from sample selection.
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13 Further, the model is generalized for the case when the selection variable is not observed. In this case the selection mechanism is specified as a probability model to account for the latent selection variable. Another generalization is to allow nonlinear specification of the primary equation (see Greene 1992 Greene , 2006 and Terza 1995, 1998 for examples of the approach). 14 An increase in the entrant-to-bidder ratio error should be positively associated with gaining entry in the spectrum contest. The residual is a proxy for unobserved private information. Thus, including the omitted selfselection residual controls for and tests for the significance of private information in explaining ex post outcomes. The authors thank the editor for this insight.
The proxy for the selection mechanism is: Next, bias arising from the inclusion of potentially endogenous variables on the right-hand side of (3) is addressed. In (3), the vector x includes both exogenous variables ( O x ) and potentially endogenous variables ( E x ).This situation occurs when NRAs design assignments to encourage entry. In particular, NRAs specify both the assignment mode (auction / beauty contest), and license availability conditions (excess licenses / set-aside licenses) and entrantonly (spectrum price and quantity) concessions.
The presence (or absence) of such conditions define a set of variables. To address any endogeneity bias introduced into the principal (probability of entry) equation by including these arguments, IV estimation is applied to the binomial probit model,
where z contains both instrumental variables and exogenous variables. The instrumental variables are specified to be strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, but are independent of the structural equation. Endogeneity bias in (2) is controlled for by the inclusion of the ˆi υ on the right-hand side (Terza et al. 2008 ).
The estimating equation that describes the probability that potential entrants win licenses is,
where
and Φ denotes the standard normal distribution, with O E, , , .
υ X e Acceptance of the Null that 0 i ρ = indicates that variable i is not a source of endogeneity bias.
The simulated maximum likelihood estimator is asymptotically consistent as the number of observations and draws approach infinity. 18 Within this framework the variances of the disturbances are normalised to unity. Additionally, standard errors are corrected for sample clustering. 19 That is, these data are partitioned into 49 (annual national assignments) mutually exclusive and exhaustive clusters. The corrected asymptotic covariance matrix is:
where V is the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix ignoring the clustering and ij g is the first-derivative matrix of the log-likelihood function for assignment i parameters in the cluster . j Greene (2008) constructs marginal effects as the coefficient vector multiplied by the density function:
The marginal effects for dummy variable d are:
Variables and Estimation
The dependent variables are defined and summary statistics provided in Table 8 . The binomial probit model is intended to provide estimates of the impact of NRA policy instruments on the probability of entry. However, potential entrants must first decide whether to contest for licenses. The decision sequence and the available data raise a sample selection issue. To obtain consistent parameter values an ancillary selection equation is required. The censored BIDRATIO equation provides a residual (omitted variable proxy) for inclusion as an argument in the probability of entry equation.
Furthermore, the empirical analysis also recognises that entry decisions are in part based on policy instruments. Under such circumstances policy-instrument variables are potentially endogenous, i.e., not independent from the disturbances of the entry probability function.
Accordingly, a binomial probit IV equation for AUCTION is estimated on exogenous and instrumental variables. Similarly, separate Poisson IV equations are estimated for EXCESS and SETASIDE. Residuals generated from these equations are included as regressors in the probability of entry equation to treat the endogeneity problem. Ancillary regressions are also run for PCONC and SCONC however, the coefficients for the residuals in the probability of entry equation are insignificant indicating that the variables are not a source of endogeneity bias. Table 9 provides explanatory variable definitions. Also reported therein are the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum sample values. NRAs control the assignment mode. While beauty contests provide NRAs with an opportunity to influence who wins licenses through the performance criteria, it is widely considered that entry is more common under auction assignments. 20 Furthermore, excess and set-aside licenses are intended to incentivise potential entrants to bid. A variable indicating the number of set-aside licenses within an assignment should be negatively related to the (contested license) entry probability.
Furthermore, spectrum price and quantity concessions are intended to increase the probability of new entry.
NRAs also specify the operator's required aftermarket network coverage (COVER), the license duration (DURATION), and financial obligations (FEE, INITIAL and RESERVE) via license conditions. In particular, COVER is the percentage of the national population to be served, while TIME indicates the maximum period by which this coverage is required. 20 Auctions can promote market entry by imposing allocation limits on individual firms or by specifying particular auction designs to achieve particular allocation outcomes (e.g., single or several licenses). Hoppe et al. (2006) argued that excessive supply capacity weakens pressure for competitive bidding, while reducing supply raises the prospect of new market entry (under specific cost conditions, tacit collusion is more difficult for incumbents). McAfee (1998) 21 In auction assignments COVER, TIME, FEE, INITIAL and RESERVE are usually specified by NRAs, and MNOs price bid based on these predetermined conditions. However, beauty contests require multiple-dimension bids based on spectrum price and some (or all) of the spectrum assignment elements (viz., COVER, TIME, FEE, INITIAL and RESERVE). Usually, regulators provide guidelines to potential bidders via supporting documents. Note: High SERVICE values indicate more time or lower coverage, or both. IREG is sourced from Global Competition Review (GCR). GCR identified telecommunication regulators as independent when decisions will not be controlled or directed by government, nor influenced by operators. BFREE is the ability to start, operate and close businesses (Heritage Foundation, 2012) . High BFREE index values suggest greater business freedom. conditions. Additionally, a negative sign is expected for the TIME 2001 coefficient for the 2001 22 As the control variable SETASIDE is determined by the regulator it is also potentially endogenous.
dot-com bubble (Klemperer, 2002) , while the TIME 2005 Note: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Estimation Results
Next, Table 13 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%. ITALY = 1, if the spectrum assignment is in Italy; = 0, otherwise.
The equation of primary interest is the second-stage binomial probit ENTRANT model.
Estimation is by maximum likelihood procedures as outlined by Greene (2008: 777-793) ,
with the results reported in Distinct patterns emerge from the results contained in Table 14 . First, national economic and mobile market condition variables that are significant in explaining the probability of entry are DENSITY (with partial effect -0.00088), INCOME (0.00001), SETASIDE (-1.54763) and TIME 2001 (-0.17987) . The setting aside of licenses enables only potential entrants to bid.
Thus, the policy instrument reduces the pool of potential entrant bidders for contested licenses, thus the probability of a potential entrant winning a contested license is diminished.
The estimated SETASIDE coefficient reports the anticipated negative sign. 23 The Appendix The main study interest is in the estimated coefficients of licensing policy instruments intended to enhance the probability of entry, viz., assignment mode (AUCTION), license availability (EXCESS), and entry incentive (PCONC and SCONC) variables. Not surprisingly, auction spectrum assignments increase the entry probability (AUCTION = 0.34517). Furthermore, allotting more licenses than the number of incumbent 2G operators (EXCESS = 0.87522) also increases the entry probability.
Finally, with regard to the concessions offered by regulators, the only significant estimated coefficient is for SCONC (= 0.15836), albeit at the 10% level. This outcome may be because potential entrants consider the measures insufficient in magnitude or ineffective because of the mode of implementation. Further study is required to determine whether the concessions approach should be modified or abandoned. Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Finally, Table 15 reports elasticity estimates for the policy instruments. The elasticity values (at the sample means) are inelastic, with the exception of EXCESS (2.626). The elastic value for EXCESS suggests that allotting 'additional' licenses to encourage entry (increase the probability of entry) is largely successful. Finally, using an auction to assign spectrum and providing quantity-based concessions also increases the entry probability. However, for the latter instrument this impact is relatively slight. 
Conclusions
It is widely accepted that regulators design spectrum assignments in an attempt to influence aftermarket competition via new entry. Accordingly, the fundamental question addressed is:
are regulatory policy instruments effective in promoting entry? This focus is important as it
has not been previously empirically tested.
Regulator policy instruments include: the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), making more licenses (spectrum blocks) than incumbent firms available, and by providing targeted bidding credits (through discounted winning bid prices or providing additional spectrum) to successful potential entrants. Not surprisingly, auction spectrum assignments, and allotting excess licenses increase the probability of entry. However, quantity concessions only have a slight impact.
Appendix Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
